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Previous research on corporate governance has extensively explored the
motives of corporate fraud. However, this research has paid little attention
to employees, the real executors of fraud, resulting in the psychological
and behavioral decision-making process of employees who commit fraud
in enterprises becoming a “black box” that has not yet been opened. Based
on the theory of planned behavior, our study integrates the existing research
findings on driving factors of employee fraud and anti-fraud practical
experience, extracts the key factors of employee fraud motive, and develops
a multidimensional scale of employee fraud motive. The exploratory factor
analysis (EFA) generates three subscales, comprising 14 items, measuring
attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioral control of employee
fraud motive. The confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) supports the reliability,
discriminant validity and convergent validity of the new scale. The multiple
regression results show that the score of employee fraud motive is positively
correlated with the amount of employee fraud occurrence, indicating that the
predictive validity of the scale holds. Overall, the scale developed in our study
displays good reliability and validity, and is worth spreading.
KEYWORDS

employee, fraud motive, scale development, theory of planned behavior, unethical
behavior, white-collar crime

Introduction
Fraud is a persistent problem in corporate governance and is increasingly becoming a
global focus. According to Occupational Fraud 2022, published by the Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE), the economic loss from fraud in all types of
organizations, including governments and businesses, is about 5% of their total annual
revenue, with an average loss of $1,783,000 per case. The former UN Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon characterized corruption as a “global threat” on the same level as terrorism and
climate change. The empirical research has found that fraud causes the firm to suffer direct
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losses and penalty losses, leads to serious damage to reputation,
and adversely affects both the capital and product markets of the
firm (Amiram et al., 2018).
Employees are the executors of corporate fraud. Regardless of
the form and purpose, corporate fraud is ultimately carried out by
individuals to serve the interests of individuals. The individuals
here are the employees of the enterprise, including management
and general employees. The classical definition of fraud also
reflects that employees are the executors of corporate fraud. ACFE
defines fraud as the use of one’s occupation for personal
enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the
employing organization’s resources or assets. The Institute of
Internal Auditors (IIA) defines fraud as an act in which the
perpetrator intentionally deceives and damages others for his or
her own personal benefit. Employees are the executors of
corporate fraud, meaning that every employee has the potential to
become a fraudster. The study of the motives of employee fraud
plays a vital role in identifying potential perpetrators, blocking
potential perpetrators from evolving into real perpetrators, and
preventing the occurrence of corporate fraud (Dorminey
et al., 2012).
However, the literature in the field of corporate governance
have paid insufficient attention to employees when studying
corporate fraud, considering firms as the executors of fraud. First,
limited by the availability of data, most current research still
defines fraud at the firm level and uses firm-level data to measure
fraud [e.g., litigation, restatements, enforcement announcements
(Karpoff et al., 2017)] and focuses primarily on financial or
accounting fraud (Hogan et al., 2008), yet such definitions
represent only a small portion of corporate fraud. ACFE classifies
fraud into three major categories: corruption, asset
misappropriation, and financial statement fraud. While according
to Occupational Fraud 2022, 86% of fraud case types are asset
misappropriation and only 9% of financial statement fraud.
Second, correspondingly, current research has limited the search
for the antecedents of fraud to firm-level factors (Dechow et al.,
2011; Perols et al., 2017; Bao et al., 2020; Xu et al., 2022), paying
insufficient attention to the individual-level factors, the factors
that account for larger percentage in the variance of fraud losses
(Holtfreter, 2008; Timofeyev, 2015). While in the field of similar
research, white-collar crime and unethical behavior, the literature
focuses more on influencing factors at the individual level.
According to a meta-analysis from Pusch and Holtfreter (2021),
the number of individual predictors of white-collar crime account
for 76%, and the number of organizational predictors account for
only 24%. In a review of unethical behavior, Trevino et al. (2014)
devote a great deal of space to reviewing the individual-level
factors of unethical behavior. In conclusion, the lack of emphasis
on employees in corporate governance research has resulted in
that the psychological and behavioral decision-making process of
employees who fraud in enterprises has been a “black box” that
has not yet been opened.
The research findings on unethical behavior and white-collar
crime and experience working in anti-fraud practice provide a
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rich set of individual-level motives for fraud. The literature in the
area of unethical behavior and white-collar crime delve into the
motives of fraud at the individual level, finding partial
psychological variables associated with fraud, such as job
satisfaction (Dalal, 2005; Judge et al., 2006; Zhang, 2020),
Machiavellian personality (Hegarty and Sims, 1978; Castille et al.,
2018; Manara et al., 2020), self-control (Hirschi and Gottfredson,
1987; Gino et al., 2011; Joosten et al., 2014), and so on. Individuallevel motives of fraud have also been summarized in anti-fraud
practice experience. For example, a well-known anti-fraud
practice experience is the U.S. Statement on Auditing Standards
No. 99, Fraud Risk Factors and Content (SAS No. 99; hereinafter
referred to as “Fraud Auditing Standards”). The Fraud Auditing
Standard uses the fraud triangle theory, which considers the three
dimensions of fraud motive, including pressure, opportunity, and
rationalization, and lists the precursor manifestations of
perpetrators under each dimension. However, the employee fraud
motives in these findings have not yet been integrated, resulting
that the question of which of the many fraud motives are most
important remain unanswered.
Therefore, our study considers employees as the executors of
corporate fraud, summarizes the motives of fraud at the employee
level, and develops the employee fraud motive scale. In the scale
development process, we form the initial scale based on the theory
of planned behavior, integrating the research findings of unethical
behavior and white-collar crime as well as the experience of antifraud practice work.
Specifically, we first integrate the research findings of
unethical behavior and white-collar crime as well as the
experience of anti-fraud practice work to form the initial
employee fraud motive scale. Then, using questionnaire data
from corporate anti-fraud leaders, we implement exploratory
factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)
based reliability and validity tests to extract the key factors of
employee fraud motive and develop the final scale. The final
scale includes three subscales of attitudes, perceived behavioral
control, and subjective norm, with 14 items. Finally, we use the
questionnaire data of the final scale to verify the predictive
validity of the scale and to analyze the internal structure of the
employee fraud motive.
The main contributions of our research are as follows. Firstly,
based on the behavioral perspective, we summarize the fraud
motives at the employee level and develop the employee fraud
motive scale, enriching the research on corporate fraud motives.
Secondly, our study theoretically and quantitatively integrates the
existing research findings and practice experience to identify the
key factors of fraud motive, which not only implicate researchers
to focus on the important issues, but also help anti-fraud
practitioners to save costs. Thirdly, our research comprehensively
and directly measures the employee fraud motive by developing a
scale, providing a quantitative basis for empirical research on
employee fraud motive. Finally, our study provides an operational
tool for corporate anti-fraud practitioners to diagnose the causes
of fraud and to prevent fraud in a more targeted manner.
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Theoretical analysis

Finally, they are different in the causes. Because the higher-level
perpetrators often have the ability to evade or override controls
that would otherwise detect fraud, the main factor leading to the
management fraud is considered to be the willingness or attitude
of the perpetrators (Holtfreter, 2005; Blickle et al., 2006), while the
main factor leading to the ordinary-employee fraud is considered
to be the supervision and control faced by the perpetrators (Belle
and Cantarelli, 2017; Kuenzi et al., 2020). In summary, the
classification of fraud by position is of great significance in the
study of the employee fraud, especially in regression models that
predict fraud.
Concepts that are closer to employee fraud are unethical
behavior and white-collar crime. Unethical behavior is defined as
any behavior by a member of an organization that violates the
widely accepted ethical norms of society (Jones, 1991). Certain
behaviors of employees such as theft, sabotage, lying to customers,
and misrepresentation in financial reports are considered as
unethical behaviors. However, other negative workplace behaviors
of employees, such as coming in late and leaving early and
neglecting work, are not considered as unethical behaviors
because they do not necessarily violate widely accepted ethical
norms of society (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010). The concept of
white-collar crime is first introduced by Sutherland (1940) and
refers to crimes committed by corporate executives (white-collar
employees) to distinguish this type of crimes from street crimes
and violent crimes. White-collar criminals mostly have high social
and economic status and usually use their position to commit
crimes such as false financial reporting, stock market
manipulation, embezzlement, swindling, bribery, personal income
tax evasion, and selling economic information (Sutherland,
1940, 1945).
While there are similarities between employee fraud and
unethical behavior or white-collar crime, there are also
differences. Both employee fraud and unethical behavior are
violations of social ethics by employees, but the differences are:
(1) Their motives are different. Unethical behavior is not
necessarily self-interest, but also includes the violation of ethics
for the benefit of the organization, such as unethical
pro-organizational behavior (Chen et al., 2016; Xu et al., 2021),
while employee fraud is for personal benefit to the detriment
of the organization. (2) They are different in the victim. The
victim of employee fraud is the owners of the enterprise, while
some of unethical behaviors, such as sexual harassment and
unethical behavior outside the workplace, do not necessarily
harm the interest of enterprise’s owners. Both employee fraud
and white-collar crime use their positions to intentionally
harm the interests of the enterprise. However, the differences
are: (1) Their executors are different. The executor of employee
fraud includes all employees of the enterprise, while the
executor of white-collar crime is limited to white-collar
employees. (2) They are different in the severity of the
consequences. Employee fraud is not all crime, but also
includes the general violations of the lesser circumstances,
while white-collar crime is a crime against criminal law.

Definition of employee fraud
We adopt the definition of ACFE for employee fraud: the use
of one’s occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate
misuse or misapplication of the employing organization’s
resources or assets. This definition has three advantages1: First, the
ACFE definition of fraud highlights that employees are the
executors of corporate fraud, fitting the purpose of this paper.
Second, because the ACFE definition of fraud has a broad scope,
classifying fraud by nature into three categories: asset
misappropriation, corruption, and financial statement fraud, the
definition is conducive to a comprehensive consideration of the
sources of the motives for fraud. Third, the ACFE definition of
fraud has a broader practical basis and is more recognized by antifraud practitioners. Since the first fraud report was published in
1996, ACFE has published 12 fraud research reports, which have
become a globally recognized authority on corporate fraud and a
must-read for many anti-fraud professionals. Based on the results
of years of research, ACFE’s definition of fraud is clearly actionable
for further research.
In terms of the classification, fraud can be divided into asset
misappropriation, corruption, and financial statement fraud
according to its nature, and can also be divided into management
fraud and ordinary-employee fraud according to the perpetrator’s
position. The distinction between management fraud and
ordinary-employee fraud is of great significance in the study of the
employee fraud. Firstly, they are different in the scope.
Management fraud can involve all types of fraud, while ordinaryemployee fraud rarely involves financial statement fraud (Amiram
et al., 2018; Veetikazhi et al., 2022). Secondly, they are different in
the consequences. According to Occupational Fraud 2022, frauds
committed by staff-level perpetrators in the number of
perpetrators and the number of cases accounted for a greater
proportion, while frauds committed by higher-level perpetrators
typically take longer to detect and cause larger losses. In addition
to causing more direct losses, such as money losses, management
fraud also causes more indirect losses, such as inducing
subordinates to fraud. According to the ethical leadership theory,
unethical behaviors of leaders can also be learned and imitated by
subordinates, which seriously damage the ethical climate of the
organization (Brown et al., 2005; Brown and Treviño, 2006).

1

Not all definitions of fraud have these advantages. For example,

U.S. National Auditing Standard (NAS) Circular 82 defines fraud as the
intentional misstatement and omission of financial reporting by a company
or enterprise. Under this definition, the executor of fraud is the company
or enterprise, and the nature of fraud is limited to financial reporting
practices only. Another example is the IIA’s definition of fraud: an act in
which the perpetrator intentionally deceives and damages others for his
or her own personal benefit. Although it is close to ACFE, the public
practice basis is insufficient.
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From the above analysis, it can be seen that the extension of
unethical behavior is the widest, followed by employee fraud, and
white-collar crime is the narrowest. Moreover, unethical behavior
includes employee fraud, and employee fraud includes whitecollar crime. Therefore, as for the motives of white-collar crime,
we can safely incorporate them as the motives of employee fraud,
and as for the motives of unethical behavior, we need to choose
the motives of behaviors in line with the definition of employee
fraud. There are abundant researches on the motives of unethical
behaviors and white-collar crimes at the individual level (KishGephart et al., 2010; Dorminey et al., 2012), providing an excellent
reference for item sources in the development of scale of employee
fraud motive.

interprets pressure as need and rationalization as greed, and adds
exposure factors.
According to diamond theory, in addition to pressure,
opportunity and rationalization factors, motives for fraud should
also include capability factors (Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004).
Diamond theory refines the opportunity factor in the fraud
triangle theory, arguing that employees will not fraud if they do
not have the capability to take advantage of opportunities to
perform and hide fraud. As described by (Wolfe and Hermanson,
2004), opportunity opens the door to fraud for employees, and
pressure and rationalization bring employees closer to the door,
but employees must be capable to walk through the door and
cover it up.
The theory of planned behavior is a famous social psychology
theory. The theory of planned behavior holds that behavioral
intention is the most direct factor affecting behavior, and
behavioral intention is influenced by attitude, subjective norm and
perceived behavioral control (Ajzen, 1985, 1991). Attitude toward
performing the behavior is a person’s general feeling of
favorableness about performing that behavior. Subjective norm is
the social pressure that individual perceives when deciding
whether or not to perform a particular behavior. Perceived
behavioral control refers to the perceived ease or difficulty of
performing the behavior in question. The theory of planned
behavior has been widely used in behavior research and has been
proved to have high explanatory and predictive power for (un)
ethical behavior (Yoon, 2011; Black et al., 2021; Wang et al., 2022).
In the field of fraud motives research, Carpenter and Reimers
(2005) find through experimental studies that both attitude and
subjective norm have significant predictive power for corporate
managers’ fraud intentions, while perceived behavioral control has
little effect on the prediction of fraud intentions. Cohen et al.
(2010) find through coding analysis of corporate fraud news
reports that, compared with other factors in the theory of planned
behavior, subjective norm is less common in the media.
The components of the above theories are different. However,
since these theories all study fraud, the components of these
theories have correspondence among the theories. Rationalization,
pressure and opportunity in the fraud triangle theory correspond
to attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioral control in
the theory of planned behavior, respectively. Exposure in the
GOEN theory is a refinement of opportunity in the fraud triangle
theory. Capability in diamond theory is also a refinement of
opportunity in fraud triangle theory. The correspondence of the
components of these theories is shown in Table 1.

Definition and theory of employee fraud
motive
Motive is defined as a reason for doing something,
especially one that is hidden or not obvious. Then, the motives
of employee fraud refer to the reasons for employee fraud,
especially the hidden or not obvious reasons. Motive has two
measuring dimensions: quantity and intensity. We develop the
scale of employee fraud motive, which fix the number of
employee fraud motives through theoretical and data analysis,
and form a special tool to measure the intensity of employee
fraud motive. At that time, the higher the enterprise score
measured by this scale, the higher the motive intensity of
employee fraud, meaning that the enterprise will have
more frauds.
In order to ensure that the scale of employee fraud motive
does not omit important factors, we sort out the existing
mainstream fraud motive theory. At present, the mainstream
fraud motive theory includes fraud triangle theory, GONE theory
and diamond theory. In recent years, scholars have begun to
explore the motive of fraud from the perspective of behavioral
psychology, such as the use of theory of planned behavior to
explain the occurrence of fraud.
Fraud triangle theory is the most widely used fraud motivation
theory at present (Dorminey et al., 2012; Raval, 2018). Cressey
(1950) first proposes the fraud triangle theory and hypothesized
that, for an act of fraud to occur, each of three criteria must
be present: (1) the actor experiences a non-shareable financial
problem, (2) the actor has an opportunity to violate a position of
trust, and (3) the actor is able to adjust his self-perception such
that he believes such a violation does not constitute criminal
behavior. These three conditions are later summed up as pressure,
opportunity and rationalization.
According to the GONE theory, the motives of fraud are
composed of G (Greed), O (Opportunity), N (Need) and E
(Exposure; Bologna et al., 1992). When employees are greedy and
in desperate need of money, they will cheat whenever there are
opportunities and it is assumed that they will not be discovered
later. Compared with the fraud triangle theory, the GONE theory
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Dimensions of employee fraud motive
We develop the scale of employee fraud motive based on
theory of planned behavior rather than other theories. This is to
combine the widely applied basis of fraud triangle theory with
the theoretical basis of behavioral psychology. On the one hand,
compared with other fraud motive theories, fraud triangle
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TABLE 1 Comparison of components of fraud motivation theories.

Theories
Fraud

it, or believing it, it must be a wise thing to do.” Injunctive norm
dictates what should be done to guide someone’s behavior by
perceiving the majority’s approval or disapproval of that person’s
behavior. (3) Perceived behavioral control can be divided into
internal factors and external factors (Ajzen and Madden, 1986).
Internal factors refer to personal quality factors, including the
amount of information an individual has, as well as personal skills,
abilities and emotions. External factors are situational factors
outside the individual.
Accordingly, we can divide the scale of employee fraud motive
into three first-level dimensions and seven second-level
dimensions. The details are shown in Table 2.

Components
Rationalization

Pressure

Opportunity

GONE theory Greed

Need

Opportunity

Exposure

Diamond

Rationalization

Pressure

Opportunity

Capability

Attitude

Subjective

Perceived behavioral

norm

control

triangle
theory

theory
Theory of
planned
behavior

Scale development and data
collection

TABLE 2 The dimensions of employee fraud motive.

First-level dimensions

Second-level dimensions

Attitude

Cognitive component

Sources for generating items

Affective component
Subjective norm

Personal norm

Based on the theory of planned behavior, we incorporate the
research findings on the motive of unethical behavior and whitecollar crime as well as the practical experience of anti-fraud as the
items of our new scale.
The research findings on the motive of unethical behavior
come from the classic reviews (Treviño et al., 2006; Kish-Gephart
et al., 2010; Li, 2022). Treviño et al. (2006) divide the motive of
unethical behavior into consciousness, judgment and intention
according to the ethical decision-making process. Kish-Gephart
et al. (2010) divide the motive of unethical behavior into three
aspects: individual characteristics, moral issue characteristics and
organizational environment characteristics. Li (2022) conducts a
bibliometric analysis to describe the characteristics and trends of
unethical pro-organizational behavior research in business and
management, and provide a systematically, transparently, and
visually reviewed the landscape and development process of
unethical pro-organizational behavior research.
The research findings on the motive of white-collar crime also
come from the classic reviews (Coleman, 1987; Benson et al.,
2009; Alalehto, 2018). Coleman (1987) proposes a theoretical
framework to explain the causes of white-collar crime from two
aspects: motivation and opportunity. Benson et al. (2009)
summarize the core theories of environmental criminology:
routine activity theory, crime pattern theory, and situational crime
prevention theory, and believed that these three theories are
applicable to white-collar crime and can be used to analyze
opportunity structure. Alalehto (2018) reviews relevant researches
on white-collar crime from the perspectives of agency logic and
structural logic.
The practice experience of anti-fraud comes from Fraud
Auditing Standards. The Fraud Auditing Standards uses the fraud
triangle theory, which considers the three dimensions of fraud
motive, including pressure, opportunity, and rationalization, and
lists the precursor manifestations of perpetrators under
each dimension.

Descriptive norm
Injunctive norm
Perceived behavioral control

External factor
Internal factor

theory is more widely used in research and practice. On the
other hand, the fraud triangle theory is more based on practical
experience and lacks the basis of behavioral psychology, so it is
not conducive to explaining and predicting fraud at the
individual level. The theory of planned behavior has been proved
to have a high explanatory and predictive power for behavior,
and its components correspond well with the rationalization,
pressure and opportunity of fraud triangle theory. Therefore,
we develop the scale of employee fraud motive based on theory
of planned behavior, and divide the employee fraud motive into
three dimensions: attitude, subjective norm, and perceived
behavioral control.
Theory of planned behavior also provides a theoretical basis
for further refinement of attitude, subjective norm and perceived
behavioral control. (1) Attitude can be divided into cognitive
component and affective component (Crites et al., 1994). The
cognitive component refers to the evaluative description of the
attitude object, including understanding, belief, doubt, and
approval or disapproval. The emotional component refers to the
personal emotional experience of the attitude object, such as
respect or contempt, sympathy or indifference, like or dislike, etc.
(2) Subjective norm can be divided into personal norm, descriptive
norm and injunctive norm (Cialdini et al., 1991). Personal norm
is a self-based standard or expectation of behavior that comes
from a person’s inner values and is enforced through expectations
of self-promotion or self-deprecation. Descriptive norm prescribes
what is (or is) right to do, guiding one’s behavior by perceiving the
behavior of the majority: “If everyone is doing it, thinking about
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Item generation

factor analysis (N = 186), respectively. Among them, the
exploratory factor analysis helps us to filter out the items with high
information content and generate the final employee fraud motive
scale. The confirmatory factor analysis helps us to test the
reliability and validity of the employee fraud motive scale.
Subsequently, the regression results of fraud occurrence and scale
score are used to verify the predictive validity of the scale. Finally,
a mean score analysis is used to show the internal structure of
employee fraud motive.

Based on the above sources, we refined and generated 48
primary items. Among them, the attitude dimension contains nine
indicators and 19 items, the subjective norm includes eight
indicators and 17 items, and the perceived behavioral control
includes eight indicators and 12 items. These items are specified
in Table 3.

Data collection

Exploratory factor analysis

We sent questionnaires online to 908 member companies of
the Enterprise Anti-Fraud Alliance (EAFA)2 on 24 September,
2021. The contents of the questionnaire include the 48-item initial
employee fraud motivation scale and the occurrence of enterprise
fraud. Part of the questionnaire used in our study is described in
the online Supplementary material. The scale is originally
developed in English, we follow the “translation and back
translation” procedure to translate it into Chinese. The
questionnaire is filled by the person in charge of internal audit of
the enterprise. Before filling out the scale, the questionnaire fillers
read “Based on your experience, do most of the perpetrators
found in your company in the past year fit the description below.”
All items are scored on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = Strongly
Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree. The questionnaires were collected
on 17 November, 2021. A total of 514 questionnaires were
collected, and 504 were finally valid. Among the 504 samples,
there are 153 listed companies, accounting for 30.36%, and 351
unlisted companies, accounting for 69.64%. In that year, the
number of sample enterprises with fraud was 371, accounting for
73.61%, and the number of sample enterprises without fraud was
133, accounting for 26.39%. Since only enterprises with fraud can
fill out the employee fraud motive scale, we mainly analyzed 371
samples with fraud.

Before exploratory factor analysis, we need to perform
preliminary tests to ensure that the sample is eligible for factor
analysis. The KMO test shows that the KMO index of the sample
is 0.806, which is higher than the standard of 0.7, indicating that
we have an adequate sample size. Bartlett test of sphericity has
value of p = 0.000 < 0.001, Chi-square = 1826.769, and degree of
freedom = 91, indicating that our sample is suitable for
factor analysis.
We conduct an exploratory factor analysis (principal axis
factoring) with an oblique rotation (direct) oblimin allowing for
correlations among factors. During the exploratory factor analysis,
items with factor loadings less than 0.4 or multiple loadings on
different factors are gradually removed. After repeated factor
analysis and deletion of items, 14 items remain on the employee
fraud motive scale, as shown in Table 4, and these items are
distributed more evenly and appropriately across the three factors.
The attitude factor contains five items. The subjective norm factor
contains five items. The perceived behavioral control factor
contains four items.

Confirmatory factor analysis
On the basis of exploratory factor analysis, we perform
confirmatory factor analysis on another group of samples
(N = 186). Confirmatory factor analysis mainly examines the
discriminant validity, convergent validity and reliability of the
employee fraud motive scale.

Data analysis
We randomly divide the sample firms in which fraud occurred
(sample size N = 371) into two groups with similar numbers and
conducted exploratory factor analysis (N = 185) and confirmatory

Discriminant validity
First, we set up two competing alternative models (two-factor
model and one-factor model) to compare with the basic threefactor model to determine the optimal model. The results of the
comparison of the goodness of fit metrics of the three models
(Table 5) show that the three-factor model has the best fit.
Specifically, the χ2/df of the three-factor model is 4.722, the
RMSEA is 0.141, and the SRMR is 0.061, all of which are smaller
than the values of the other two models. The CFI of the threefactor model is 0.847 and the TLI is 0.812, and these values are
larger than the values of the other two models. In summary, it is
clear that the basic model is better than the other alternative

2 The Enterprise Anti-Fraud Alliance (EAFA), formerly known as the China
Enterprise Anti-Fraud Alliance, was founded in 2015 by the Guangdong
Provincial Enterprise Internal Control Association, China Vanke, Alibaba,
Shimao, CIMC, Midea, Country Garden, Fosun and the Internal Control
Research Center of Enterprises and non-profit organizations of Sun Yat-sen
University. The EAFA is committed to corporate anti-fraud research and
standard setting, perpetrator blacklist sharing, mutual assistance of antifraud resources, and certification of international Certified Anti-Fraud
Professional (CAP), providing Chinese wisdom and Chinese solutions for
the global anti-fraud cause.

Frontiers in Psychology

06

frontiersin.org

Lin et al.

10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1026519

TABLE 3 The primary items of scale of employee fraud motive.

1st-level dimensions

2nd-level dimensions

Indicators (sources)

Items

Attitude

Cognitive component

Moral awareness (Reynolds, 2006)

Knowing that the fraud is wrong before exposure

Cognitive moral development (Blasi, 1980)

Usually knowing right from wrong

Moral philosophies (Henle et al., 2005)

Usually caring about the people around them

Moral identity (Aquino and Reed, 2002)

Usually attaching great importance to moral cultivation

Responsibility (Collins and Schmidt, 1993)

Usually being responsible

Moral intensity (Jones, 1991; Paolillo and

Claiming their frauds hurt no one;

Vitell, 2002)

Claiming their frauds do not harm those they know
well;
Claiming their frauds are for good causes;
Claiming their frauds are common actions;
Claiming the adverse consequences of their frauds are
not serious;
Claiming the probability of adverse consequences from
their frauds is very small;
Claiming their frauds will have few adverse
consequences in the near future

Affective component

Moral emotion (Eisenberg, 2000)

Usually feeling no guilt or shame for their mistakes

Locus of control (Trevino and Youngblood, Usually tending to attribute it to external factors rather
1990)

than to themselves

Moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999)

Usually tending to make excuses for their mistakes;
claiming the company owes them;
Claiming they are just borrowing and will pay back
later;
Claiming they will pay the company more in other ways;
Believing certain things, such as honor or integrity, are
expendable

Subjective norm

Personal norm

Personal financial pressure (Agnew, 1992)

Trying to relieve their financial pressure by their frauds;
Usually living beyond their means;
Being unable to pay their debt before their frauds;
Having bad credit histories before their frauds;
Suffering from personal financial losses before their
frauds;
Encountering unexpected financial needs before their
frauds;
Usually engaging in bad behaviors such as gambling,
drug abuse, alcoholism, visiting prostitutes and
extramarital affairs;
Claiming that once they get through their financial
difficulties, they make up for the gaps created by their
frauds

Descriptive norm

Training (Weaver et al., 1999)

Usually lacking ethics training

Family education (Demuth and Brown,

Lacking good family education

2004)
Injunctive norm

Compensation incentives (Hill et al., 1992)

Usually being paid based on performance

Performance goals (Schweitzer et al., 2004)

Trying to achieve performance goals through their frauds

Job satisfaction (Judge et al., 2006)

Usually being dissatisfied with their jobs

Work pressure (Fraud Auditing Standards)

Usually being not recognized for their performance;
Usually being very concerned about losing their jobs;
Usually being very eager to be promoted;
Usually claiming they are being paid far less than they
contribute
(Continued)

Frontiers in Psychology

07

frontiersin.org

Lin et al.

10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1026519

TABLE 3 (Continued)

1st-level dimensions

2nd-level dimensions

Indicators (sources)

Items

Perceived behavioral control

External factor

Power (Dunn, 2004)

Usually holding a great deal of power

Economic temptation (Hegarty and Sims,

Profiting greatly from their frauds

1978)
Internal factor

Greedy (Fraud Auditing Standards)

Usually being very greedy

Self-control (Hirschi and Gottfredson,

Usually having good self-control

1987)
Machiavellian (Hegarty and Sims, 1979;

Usually being very utilitarian and only looking at the

Dahling et al., 2009)

results, not the process;
Usually having a strong desire to control;
Usually having a strong desire for money, power and
status;
Usually distrusting others

Self-efficacy (Flannery and May, 2000)

Usually being confident in their capabilities

Hedonism (Blickle et al., 2006)

Usually liking to enjoy life

Information asymmetry (Dunk, 1993)

Usually having more information at work that only they
know;
Usually performing work that is difficult to judge the
quality of

TABLE 4 The factor matrix of the employee fraud motive scale (N=185).

Items

Attitude

Subjective norm

Perceived behavioral
control

Claiming they will pay the company more in other ways

0.580

0.065

0.299

Believing certain things, such as honor or integrity, are

0.626

0.011

0.333

0.770

0.010

0.152

0.887

0.088

0.027

0.833

0.042

0.047

0.089

0.757

0.124

Usually being dissatisfied with their jobs

0.035

0.884

0.006

Usually being very eager to be promoted

0.031

0.805

0.070

Claiming that once they get through their financial difficulties,

0.005

0.872

0.026

expendable
Claiming the adverse consequences of their frauds are not
serious
Claiming the probability of adverse consequences from their
frauds is very small
Claiming their frauds will have few adverse consequences in
the near future
Usually engaging in bad behaviors such as gambling, drug
abuse, alcoholism, visiting prostitutes and extramarital affairs

they make up for the gaps created by their frauds
Usually living beyond their means

0.080

0.773

0.058

Usually liking to enjoy life

0.205

−0.050

0.640

Usually being very utilitarian and only looking at the results,

0.053

0.082

0.656

Usually holding a great deal of power

0.091

0.065

0.771

Usually being very greedy

0.156

0.136

0.772

not the process

Statistics that load ≥ 0.40 are in bold.

models and the structure of the three-factor model is validated.
The results support the discriminant validity of the scale.
Second, we compare the square root of the average variable
extracted (AVE) for each dimension of employee fraud motive with
the correlation coefficient between the dimensions (Table 6). The

Frontiers in Psychology

square root of AVE for attitude is 0.789, the square root of AVE for
perceived behavioral control is 0.759, and the square root of AVE
for subjective norm is 0.840. They are all greater than the correlation
coefficients of the rows and columns in which they are located.
These results also support the discriminant validity of the scale.
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TABLE 5 The goodness of fit metrics for the three candidate models
(N=186).

χ2

df

χ2/df

RMSEA

SRMR

CFI

TLI

349.401

74

4.722

0.141

0.061

0.847

0.812

558.196

75

7.443

0.186

0.109

0.732

0.675

One-factor 1112.835

77

14.452

0.269

0.247

0.425

0.321

Models
Three-

motives. Predictive validity also has to be established in the
construct validation process. We match the questionnaire data
with the corporate basic information data and finally obtain 298
valid samples. Using these samples, we run linear regressions of
the amount of fraud losses (Loss), the total duration of frauds
(Duration), the number of frauds (Frauds), and the number of
perpetrators (Perpetrators) on the score of employee fraud motive
(Motive). In the regression model, the control variables include
registered capital (Capital), number of employees (Employees),
firm age (Firm_age), whether the firm is listed or not (List), the
shareholding ratio of the first largest shareholder (Top1), whether
the firm is registered in one of the developed provinces3
(Developed), whether the fraud involves the management
(Management), and industry fixed effects (Industry). See Table 8
for the variable definitions. Among them, the data on the
occurrence of corporate fraud and the score of employee fraud
motive are obtained from the questionnaire survey, and the data
on the control variables are obtained from the data of corporate
basic information.4
To ensure that the sample of predictive validity is appropriate,
descriptive statistics have been performed on variables
participating in the regression to test for the presence of outliers
in these samples. The descriptive statistics (Table 9) show that the
values of all variables are in the normal range, indicating that the
sample is suitable for predictive validity. The mean of Loss is
14.567, suggesting that a firm suffers a loss of 2.120 million (e14.567)
from fraud on average. The mean of Duration is 3.985, suggesting
that in a firm all frauds in total last 53.785 (e3.985) months on
average. The mean of Frauds is 8.698, suggesting that a firm
discovers approximately 8.698 fraud cases on average. The mean
of Perpetrators is 14.205, suggesting that a firm discovers
approximately 14.205 perpetrators on average. The mean of Motive
is 4.219, indicating that the employee fraud motive in the sample
tends to show a right-leaning normal distribution.
The regression results (Table 10) show that the regression
coefficients of employee fraud motive are significantly positive,
indicating that employee fraud motivate is positively related to
the amount of fraud occurring in the firm. As shown in column
(1), the coefficient of Loss on Motive is significantly positive at
1% level, which shows that the employee fraud motive
significantly increases the fraud losses. As shown in column (2),
the coefficient of Duration is significantly positive at 1% level,
which shows that the employee fraud motive significantly
increases the duration of frauds. As shown in column (3), the
coefficient of Frauds is significantly positive at 1% level, which
shows that the employee fraud motive significantly increases the
number of frauds. As shown in column (4), the coefficient of

factor
model
Two-factor
model
model
The three-factor model is a model in which attitude, subjective norm, and perceived
behavioral control are each one factor. The two-factor model is a model in which
attitude and perceived behavioral control are combined as one factor and subjective
norm is one factor; the one-factor model is a model in which attitude, subjective norm,
and perceived behavioral control are combined as one factor.

TABLE 6 Correlation coefficient matrix between dimensions and AVE
of each dimension.

Attitude

Attitude

Subjective
norm

Perceived
behavioral
control

(0.789)

Subjective norm

0.392

(0.759)

Perceived

0.145

0.186

(0.840)

behavioral
control
The value in parentheses is the square root of the AVE of the dimension.

TABLE 7 The convergent validity and reliability of the scale.

AVE

α

γ

0.607

0.871

0.955

Attitude

0.623

0.885

0.892

Subjective norm

0.706

0.920

0.923

Perceived behavioral

0.577

0.848

0.845

Employee fraud
motive

control

Convergent validity and reliability
Table 7 reports the results of the tests of the convergent
validity and reliability of the employee fraud motive scale. In
terms of convergent validity, the AVE of the scale and the AVE of
each subscale exceed 0.5, supporting the convergent validity of the
scale. In terms of reliability, the internal consistency (α) for the
scale and the α for each subscale exceed 0.8, and the composite
reliability (γ) for the scale and the γ for each subscale exceed 0.7,
supporting the reliability of the scale.

3 Following Chen et al. (2022), the developed provinces we define include

Predictive validity

Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang.
4

The results so far are necessary but not sufficient to
demonstrate the utility of the new measure of employee fraud
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The data of corporate basic information is manually collected from

Qichacha (https://www.qcc.com/), one of the largest enterprise credit
information inquiry platforms in China.
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TABLE 10 Predictive validity test of the employee fraud motive scale.

TABLE 8 Definitions of the variables in predictive validity test.

Variables

Definitions

Loss

The natural logarithm of the total
amount of fraud losses

Duration

Motive

The natural logarithm of the total
number of months all frauds lasted

Frauds

The number of frauds

Perpetrators

The number of perpetrators

Motive

The mean score of the 14 items in the

Capital
Employees

employee fraud motive scale
Capital

Firm_age

The natural logarithm of the registered
capital

Employees

List

The natural logarithm of the number of
employees

Firm_age

The natural logarithm of the firm age

List

The dummy variable if the firm is listed,

Top1
Developed

equals 1, otherwise equals 0
Top1

The shareholding ratio of the first largest

Management

shareholder
Developed

The dummy variable if the firm is

Constant

registered in one of the developed
provinces (Beijing, Shanghai,

Industry

Guangdong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang),
equals 1, otherwise equals 0
Management

The dummy variable if the fraud involves
the management, equals 1, otherwise
equals 0

Industry

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Loss

Duration

Frauds

Perpetrators

0.386***

0.367***

1.870***

3.241***

(0.147)

(0.107)

(0.680)

(1.159)

0.073

0.017

−0.039

−0.434

(0.065)

(0.045)

(0.373)

(0.705)

0.269***

0.272***

1.953***

3.856***

(0.073)

(0.061)

(0.621)

(1.030)

−0.080

−0.048

−1.767**

−1.135

(0.165)

(0.117)

(0.866)

(1.484)

0.207

−0.543***

−2.782**

−3.340

(0.224)

(0.169)

(1.351)

(2.269)

−0.290

−0.815***

−4.097*

−0.649

(0.337)

(0.270)

(2.215)

(3.752)

0.258

0.007

0.434

−1.583

(0.190)

(0.142)

(1.152)

(2.145)

0.873***

0.545***

2.613**

3.498

(0.203)

(0.150)

(1.275)

(2.240)

9.717***

0.972

−5.496

−20.184*

(0.955)

(0.748)

(6.234)

(11.679)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

R2

0.199

0.226

0.157

0.137

Adjusted R2

0.163

0.191

0.119

0.098

F

5.961

6.767

2.995

3.338

N

298

298

298

298

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10%
significance levels, respectively.

Industry fixed effect. The industry
classification is based on the 2012
industry classification of the China
Securities Regulatory Commission

Internal structure of employee fraud
motive

TABLE 9 Descriptive statistics of the variables in predictive validity
test.

Variables

N

Mean

SD

Min

Loss

298

14.567

1.716

12.429

14.914

Duration

298

3.985

1.315

1.099

4.094

6.805

Frauds

298

8.698

10.096

1.000

5.000

41.000

Perpetrators

298

14.205

17.104

0.000

8.000

68.000

Motive

298

4.219

0.716

1.000

4.208

6.433

Capital

298

10.592

1.728

4.605

10.820

14.145

Employees

298

8.055

1.382

3.434

8.006

12.899

Firm_age

298

2.610

0.660

0.693

2.773

3.689

List

298

0.332

0.472

0.000

0.000

1.000

Top1

298

0.674

0.304

0.078

0.716

1.000

Developed

298

0.614

0.488

0.000

1.000

1.000

Management

298

0.336

0.473

0.000

0.000

1.000

Median

So far, our results have verified the reliability and validity
of the employee fraud motive scale. The scale can be used not
only to explain and predict the amount of fraud in enterprises,
but also to analyze the internal structure of employee fraud
motive. Using the whole sample of questionnaires (N = 371),
the analysis results (Table 11) show that the factor with the
highest mean scores is perceived behavioral control, followed
by attitude, and finally subjective norm. It also means that the
most important factor to constitute the motive of fraud is the
perceived behavioral control, followed by attitude, and finally
subjective norm.

Max
17.823

Conclusion and discussion
Based on the theory of planned behavior, our study integrates
the existing research findings on driving factors of employee
fraud and anti-fraud practical experience, extracts the key factors
of employee fraud motive, and develops a multidimensional scale
of employee fraud motive. The exploratory factor analysis

Perpetrators is significantly positive at 1% level, which shows that
the employee fraud motive significantly increases the number of
perpetrators. Overall, the results support the predictive validity
of the scale.
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TABLE 11 Internal structure of employee fraud motive.

Items
Claiming they will pay the company

and directly measures the employee fraud motive by developing a
scale, providing a quantitative basis for empirical research on
employee fraud motive. Finally, our study provides an operational
tool for corporate anti-fraud practitioners to diagnose the causes
of fraud and to prevent fraud in a more targeted manner.
Our study also has the following practical implications: First,
existing research findings and practical experience have
identified numerous fraud motives, but not all of them are
important. The items in the employee fraud motive scale
developed in our study are the key factors of fraud motive, and
anti-fraud practitioners can save a lot of cost by referring to
these key factors to identify and prevent fraud. Secondly, this
study finds that the most important factor that constitutes fraud
motives is perceived behavioral control, followed by behavioral
attitudes and finally subjective norm. Therefore, when
enterprises are faced with anti-fraud resource investment
constraints, they can also allocate resources following this order
of priority. Finally, enterprises can establish a personal fraud risk
assessment and early warning system for employees to manage
fraud risk and focus on monitoring employees with higher fraud
risk. For example, employees who usually like to enjoy life, are
utilitarian, hold greater power, and are greedy have higher fraud
risks. For these employees, companies need to focus on
prevention.
Our study has limitations that provide promising directions
for future research. First, in order to implicate researchers to focus
on the important issues and help anti-fraud practitioners to save
costs, we only extract the key factors instead of all factors of
employee fraud motive to develop the employee fraud motive
scale. Even though we integrate the existing research findings and
practice experience about the motives of fraud and verify the
reliability and validity of the scale, it is difficult to ensure that no
other key factors are missed. Therefore, future research should
further examine whether the scale misses key factors. Second, due
to the limitations of available data, in the predictive validity test,
we only consider the classification of fraud by the perpetrator’s
position, rather than the usual classification of fraud types, such
as asset misappropriation, corruption, and financial statement
fraud. Future research should collect richer data to test the
predictive validity of the scale for the three different types of fraud.
Finally, we use a sample of Chinese companies to test the reliability
and validity of the scale. China is the world’s most populous
country and the world’s second largest economy, so the scale has
a wide range of applications. However, China is still an emerging
market country with unique institutions and culture, so the scale
is not necessarily applicable to other countries. Future research
should be conducted across cultures to test the applicability of
the scale.

Mean score
4.426

more in other ways
Believing certain things, such as honor

4.566

or integrity, are expendable
Claiming the adverse consequences of

4.695

their frauds are not serious
Claiming the probability of adverse

4.720

consequences from their frauds is very
small
Claiming their frauds will have few

4.617

adverse consequences in the near future
Attitude

4.605

 Usually engaging in bad behaviors such

3.523

as gambling, drug abuse, alcoholism,
visiting prostitutes and extramarital
affairs
 Usually being dissatisfied with their jobs

3.313

 Usually being very eager to be promoted

3.164

 Claiming that once they get through

3.108

their financial difficulties, they make up
for the gaps created by their frauds
 Usually living beyond their means

3.345

Subjective norm

3.291

 Usually liking to enjoy life

5.005

 Usually being very utilitarian and only

4.884

looking at the results, not the process
 Usually holding a great deal of power

4.693

 Usually being very greedy

4.903

Perceived behavioral control

4.871

Employee fraud motive

4.256

The bold values are aggregated statistics.

generates three subscales, comprising 14 items, measuring
attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioral control of
employee fraud motive. The confirmatory factor analysis supports
the reliability, discriminant validity and convergent validity of the
new scale. The multiple regression results show that the score of
employee fraud motive is positively correlated with the amount
of employee fraud occurrence, indicating that the predictive
validity of the scale holds. Overall, the scale developed in our
study displays good reliability and validity, and is worth
spreading.
The main contributions of our research are as follows. Firstly,
based on the behavioral perspective, we summarize the fraud
motives at the employee level and develop the employee fraud
motive scale, enriching the research on fraud motives. Secondly,
our study theoretically and quantitatively integrates the existing
research findings and practice experience to identify the key
factors of fraud motive, which not only implicate researchers to
focus on the important issues, but also help anti-fraud
practitioners to save costs. Thirdly, our research comprehensively
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